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Artistic Creativity and Suffering 
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	 Can negative psychological experiences be good for a person? If so, what could 
possibly be good about them? And when and under what circumstances might they be 
good? In what follows, my aim is to begin a philosophical exploration of these issues by 
focusing on a particular case—the relationship between negative affective experience and 
artistic creativity.  
 There is a strong, empirically documented link between artistic creativity and 
psychiatric mood disorders (Jamison 1996; Andreasen 1987; Richards et al. 1988; 
Jamison 1989; Ludwig 1994; Post 1996; Kaufman & Baer 2002; Kyaga et al. 2011; 
Kyaga et. al. 2013). Though no one knows why, it is now well established that poets, 
fiction writers, visual artists and musicians are much more likely than ordinary people to 
suffer from either manic-depressive illness (bi-polar disorder) or unipolar depression.1 To 
give but one example, Jamison (1996) found rates of depression 8 to 10 times higher in 
artists and writers than in the rest of the population. In addition, some people believe that 
the link between artistic creativity and mental illness may be tight: that darkly negative 
moods may turn out to be necessary for artistic creative expression (Jamison 1996). 
  If this were true,2 it would raise interesting questions about prudential value, i.e. 
about what is (extrinsically) good for certain creative individuals.3 Many people not only 
value the creative products of others, they value being creative. Indeed, most people 
assume that an individual’s production of works of art is something that is good for her. 
But if creative production is good for a person and negative experience bad—though 
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necessary for creative production—this raises interesting, highly complex questions about 
whether and when such experiences may be all-things-considered worth it. Nor are these 
merely abstract questions.  
 Consider issues relating to treatment. Creative individuals who have recurring 
bouts of major depression or of manic-depressive illness are typically candidates for 
psychiatric treatment that, in many cases, could eliminate or at least seriously mitigate 
their suffering. Yet such individuals sometimes choose to forgo treatment, particularly 
medication. The reasons are complex. Not all people respond to current medications, and 
many medications have side effects unrelated to creativity (e.g. weight gain, dry mouth, 
tremors, loss of libido) that individuals understandably dislike.4 But it remains true that 
many people are wary of medication because they fear the effects of treatment on their 
creative lives. If that is so, then even if we develop new medications that lack the 
unpleasant side effects, such worries will persist.  
 Some people can’t understand how negative experiences of the sort tolerated by 
such individuals could have value. Surely, they assume, a person with a severe mental 
illness should welcome anything that might curb it. However, as a general conclusion this 
is too strong. It reveals a lack of insight into the many different things individuals value 
about their lives, including the very real value that artistic productivity adds.  
 However, the opposite general conclusion—that anything is worth enduring for 
the sake of art—is equally unjustified and equally lacking in insight. Still, some people 
adopt it. There are people who are virulently anti-treatment and who seem to assume that 
creativity is a kind of sacred value, not to be weighed against, or compared with, any 
others. This latter mentality is well illustrated by an anecdote from the psychiatrist Peter 
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Kramer. Kramer reports that when he was giving talks about his book Listening to 
Prozac, he repeatedly encountered the same question. “With discouraging reliability” he 
reports, someone from each audience would ask, “What if Prozac had been available in 
van Gogh’s time? (2005: 31)” In each case, the question was presented as a challenge, as 
a kind of reductio of the claim that medication to relieve negative psychological states is 
typically good. The questioners assumed that there was at least one clear set of cases 
where medication would not be good, namely, cases involving artists. Although the point 
was partly about how the widespread use of medication among artists would not be good 
for the rest of us (because we would collectively lose so much great art), it was also 
clearly meant to underscore the badness of medication for individual artists themselves.  
 In what follows, I shall set aside concerns about the good of others and focus on 
the question of when (if ever) negative experiential states might be good for a particular 
creative individual. I take it that concern for the individual morally trumps concern about 
the value for the world of great art. If a particular life path would be (overall) bad for 
someone, or significantly worse for her than some other easily available path, then we 
should not encourage her to pursue the worse path, even if great art is thereby lost. Proper 
concern for an individual requires concern for her welfare for its own sake. Of course, 
individuals themselves may wish to pursue certain goods knowing that the pursuit is 
against their own best interests. I do not assume that most people do or even ought to care 
most about their own good.  
 A few clarifications are necessary. First, it is important to distinguish between 
negative affective experience and suffering. I use ‘negative experience’ and similar terms 
to refer to the broad category of negative affective states and reserve the word ‘suffering’ 
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for the more extreme forms of such experience. Since both refer to psychological states, 
neither is the same as adversity. Adversity is non-mental and refers to negative events in 
a person’s life, the kinds of events that make a life difficult such as illness, poverty or 
unfortunate accidents. Though adversity can and often does lead to negative experience, 
and even suffering, this is not always the case. 
 Many discussions of the lives of creative people run together adversity and 
negative psychological experience. We are all familiar with stories about famous artists 
who have had to endure many hardships on the way to success. Poverty and lack of 
recognition are common, which is why the phrase “starving artist” has become a familiar 
trope. But not all artists who experience hardships suffer. My question is not about the 
value of hardship. It is a general question about the value of negative psychological 
states, and a particular question about the value (if any) of intense psychological distress.  
 Second, although I focus here on questions about prudential value or well- being, 
I neither argue for, nor assume the truth of, any particular theory of well- being. I do 
assume that psychological states are among the things that matter prudentially, but not 
that they are the only things that matter.5  
 In what follows, I want first to consider what it would take to establish that 
negative psychological experiences (of any sort) have significant extrinsic value. More 
specifically, what would we want to know before choosing to endure such experiences 
for the sake of some other good? I also want to develop a framework to help us 
distinguish between different types and levels of negative psychological experience and 
then ask of the more extreme forms of negative experience whether they are ever worth 
enduring. Ultimately, I argue that it can only rarely (if ever) be worthwhile to endure 
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suffering for the sake of creativity (or for that matter any other good).  
 
§1.0 What Sort of Connection?  
	
	 What is the connection between negative experiential states and creativity? No 
one is sure exactly, since there is so much conflicting data. Still it is possible to say a bit 
by way of clarifying the possibilities.  
 First, however, I need to address a couple of potential confusions. To begin with, 
even those theorists who think there may be a necessary connection between negative 
experiential states and creativity do not claim that this is a connection that holds for all 
creative people. Obviously there are many creative people who never exhibit any signs of 
mental illness or even signs of milder negativity. So the claim cannot be that negative 
affective experience is generally necessary. Rather, the idea is that for particular 
individuals—given the way they are constituted—it might turn out that negative affect is 
a necessary part of the path they must follow to realize their creative potential. For these 
individuals, even if not for others, there is no path to creative expression free from (some 
degree of) psychological disturbance.  
 Second, the claim that negative affect might be necessary for creativity is not the 
claim that periods of negative affect are themselves periods of creative production. It is 
well known that most people produce little or nothing during depressive episodes. As 
Kieran (2014) reminds us, “Virginia Woolf could barely write when depressed, Van 
Gogh was unable to paint when in seemingly similar states and Coleridge suffered a 
deeply paralyzing writer's block for years due to anxiety.”6 The general idea with respect 
to artistic creativity is just that negative experiences might be part of the path that leads to 
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creative production, where the production in question could just as easily occur at a later 
time, once the person is no longer severely depressed or anxious. The negative affect and 
the creative production need not occur simultaneously (Richards 1981; Jamison 1996).  
 There are several different ways one might think about the relationship between 
negative affect and creativity. On one view, which I shall call the bundle theory, certain 
individuals must pass through negative states in order to create (presumably, at some later 
time). On this view, negative experience does not contribute directly to the creative 
process, but is an element in a bundle of elements where the particular elements cannot 
(for whatever reason) be separated from one another (at least not currently). The 
individual must either accept the whole package or none of it. This might be the case, for 
example, if we were to discover that in certain individuals with affective mental illness, 
negative affect and creative thought processes were two different, independent effects of 
a single underlying disease process.7 We would then be interested in knowing whether we 
could eliminate one, but only one, of the two effects. It would be nice if this were 
possible. If it were, then negative affect would not be necessarily linked to creativity. But 
there are no guarantees that the two would be separable. It is an empirical question 
whether the bundle model is even the right model. But even if it were, it would be a 
further empirical question whether one effect (negative psychological states) could be 
suppressed without altering the other (the creativity). The messy reality of human biology 
might not allow it. If that were true, then negative affect would be (at least for certain 
individuals) an ineliminable part of creative production.  
 The second view of the relationship between creativity and negative experiences 
is what I shall call the special ingredient view.8 On this account, negative experiences 
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are not just by-products of something else that enables creativity—they actually 
contribute to creativity directly. On this view, negative affective experiences are 
necessary for creative production in the way that certain ingredients are necessary for the 
creation of good food. More concretely, the idea is that something specific is gained or 
learned or acquired during the passage through negative states, something that then 
influences the individual’s subsequent work. Whereas on the first model negative 
experience is unavoidable but not a causal contributor, on the second model it is a 
contributor and this fact explains its unavoidability.  
 One might wonder what could possibly be gained or acquired from negative 
experiences, especially deeply negative ones. Since many artists have suffered from bi-
polar disorders, there is a natural tendency to assume that if there is a contribution to 
creativity from the illness, it is a contribution that comes from the manic side (Jamison 
1996: 118).9 Yet, although manic tendencies and the experiences they create may also 
contribute to artistic production in important ways, many artists nonetheless insist that 
their negative experiences—their depressions and anxieties—are key as well.10 What then 
might deeply negative experiences contribute?  
  One hypothesis is that since so much artistic work is about the expression of 
emotion, artists who have deeper and wider experience of extremes of emotion may gain 
from their experiences a kind of emotional insight or knowledge that improves their 
creative work.11 Of course, the kinds of emotional experiences produced by affective 
illness are typically extreme, so one might wonder why one would need experience of the 
extremes to create good art. Presumably great art speaks to large numbers of people by 
capturing and reflecting something of their experiences, giving powerful expression to 
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something they could not have expressed so well themselves. But if, as seems likely, the 
extremes of experience are not the experience of most, it is not clear why intimate 
knowledge of extremes would improve art or enable artists to speak to a wider audience.  
 One possibility is that most of us can only recognize, and so can only begin to 
learn from and interpret, our own experiences when these are presented to us in more 
dramatic, larger-than-life forms. A certain degree of grandiosity and exaggeration are 
needed to enable us to foreground and become aware of the features of our own 
emotional life, features that so easily slide into the background. On this view, we become 
familiar with the subtleties of the human emotional landscape by having it presented to us 
on a grand scale. If our own appreciation for sorrow (which is an inevitable aspect of 
human life) is deepened by contact with work that paints sorrow in powerful ways, and if 
the ability to express sorrow in those ways depends on experiencing it in its extremes, 
then this might be an explanation of the way in which negative experience gives artists 
something important and essential.  
 It is also well known that mood is relevant to the way the mind stores and then 
later accesses information (Morris 1999: 172-4; Schacter 1996: 209-212). Current mood 
influences what you retain now for the future and also influences now what you can 
access about your past. When a person is in a good mood, she focuses on and forms more 
memories about the positive aspects of whatever is happening to her. When she is in a 
negative mood, the opposite is true. But also, when a person is in a good mood, she can 
more easily access information about positive aspects of her past and is unlikely to 
spontaneously remember much that is negative. But when she is in a negative frame of 
mind, the opposite holds: she then has greater access to her negative memories. Because 
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different affective states make different material accessible, some theorists have 
hypothesized that frequent swings of emotion might give an individual a creative 
advantage by giving her access to more, different memories and ideas. And indeed, 
fluidity of thought and the generation of numerous ideas are associated with creativity. 
Frequent swings might also give an individual more of an ability to adopt differing 
perspectives on the very same events in her life, which might also contribute to important 
insights.  
 One final putative “benefit” of negative affect is worth mentioning, because I 
doubt it really is one. It is often said that depressed people have a more realistic picture of 
the world. The value of negative affect (it is said) is that it allows a person to see the 
world as it is, whereas others are, to a greater or lesser extent, deluded about the state of 
the world. This is not a new idea, but one found in many subtle variations in both 
literature and philosophy. The following lines from Herman Melville offer (one of many) 
example(s): “In [the] flashing revelations of grief’s wonderful fire we see all things as 
they are, and though when the electric element is gone, the shadows once more descend 
and the false outlines of objects again return, yet not with their former power to deceive 
(1996 [1852]: 88)” On one reading, Melville is claiming that grief provides general 
insight into the real nature of things (“we see things as they are”). But interpreted 
literally, this is too strong. No doubt there is an element of truth in this idea, but only an 
element.  
 No doubt part of what Melville has in mind is the way in which grief or despair 
can re-acquaint us with very real truths that we often ignore—for example, truths about 
our own mortality and the mortality of those we love. But this is compatible with the 
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thought that negative states do not provide ‘the’ authoritative perspective on reality. The 
world contains both good and horrible things, and there is no reason to embrace the idea 
that the thoroughgoing negative perspective is correct, or even the idea that it is more 
congruent with how things are. Thus, although depression can put us in touch with truths 
we often forget, it can simultaneously put us out of touch with others. The idea that 
negative affect might enhance one’s ability to see things “as they are” has gained a 
certain currency in recent years because of the psychological thesis known as “depressive 
realism (Alloy & Abramson 1979).” However, these days many psychologists are 
skeptical of depressive realism (Ackermann & DeRubeis 1991; Haaga & Beck 1995; 
Dobson & Pusch 1995; Peterson 2006: 95-6). 
 Though I do not doubt that negative affect may have some benefits, particularly 
for creativity, I am deeply skeptical of the widespread tendency to over- state the case. A 
common theme in discussions of depression is what the psychiatrist Peter Kramer (2000) 
has called “the valorization of sadness.”12 Building from the idea that people in the grips 
of negative affect are more in tune with reality, the suffering of such individuals is then 
viewed as, in some sense, elevated and noble. Though they suffer, they see what the rest 
of us do not. We should resist such romanticized, overblown generalizations and instead 
look for ways to concretely assess what is gained and lost in negative states.  
	
§2.0 Assessing the Value of Negative Experience  
	 Having considered how negative affect and creativity might be linked and having 
argued that it is at least plausible that such a link might be necessary, at least for certain 
people, I want to consider what this might mean for prudential decision- making. Might it 
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ever be worth it, all-things-considered, to endure negative states for the sake of what is 
gained from them? Here I want to offer a few, general observations about choosing 
negatives for the sake of positives.  
 It is extremely important to distinguish two different perspectives we can adopt on 
decisions: the prospective perspective and the retrospective one. What we know 
prospectively is often limited, and so we must choose in the face of great uncertainty, on 
the basis of our best information. However, most of our experience (such as it is) with 
judging the value of bad events comes from the retrospective perspective. If I am trying 
to understand (prospectively) whether, and if so when, it might make sense to tolerate 
negatives for the sake of positives, I may well turn to the stories and accounts of those 
who have experienced similar negatives, looking to see whether they view their 
experiences as having been worth it. But there are potential dangers involved in listening 
to those who occupy the retrospective perspective. Moreover, certain questions, which it 
is important to consider prospectively, do not arise from the retrospective standpoint.  
 One common barrier to thinking clearly about the value of negative experiences 
stems from the fact that we are—most of us at least—strongly motivated to look for good 
in the midst of bad. To focus on good things and, in some cases, to create something new 
and good out of a bad experience is comforting. It allows an individual to feel better, to 
move on, and to view her own continuing narrative in positive terms. All of this is 
understandable, and in many instances the things it spurs individuals to accomplish are 
admirable. But it does mean that we are inclined to think that our negative experiences 
have contributed to later good outcomes, even when they have not. Thus, what people say 
on this score should be viewed with a degree of caution. There will be tendencies to 
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exaggerate the extent of the link and to see (with hindsight bias) more value than is really 
there.  
 One extremely important question that should be considered prospectively is 
whether one has reason to think that the good one is aiming at will really outweigh the 
negatives one will have to endure to reach it.  
 Importantly, this is the kind of question that rarely arises for those thinking about 
matters retrospectively. If a negative event in our life is already a given—something we 
cannot alter—then while we may be interested in whether the negative event ultimately 
contributed to something positive, we have little reason to inquire too precisely into the 
relative weights of the values. If we do raise such issues, we will be biased in favor of 
viewing the good as fully compensating the bad whether it did or not. After all, that 
makes for a much better, much more comforting personal story. So again, we must be 
somewhat cautious when it comes to accepting as guidance for our own lives the 
retrospective reports of others. 
 A second important question is whether the negatives are really necessary in this 
case. After all, it might not be true of all individuals that they need negative affective 
experiences in order to be creatively productive. And even if they do need some of this, it 
is worth questioning whether they need the kind and degree of it that, left untreated, they 
will likely experience. Once again, this is not the kind of question that naturally arises 
from the retrospective perspective, since again, if a negative event that contributed to a 
good one has already occurred and cannot be changed, we have little motivation to 
discover whether the same good outcome might have been had with a less negative initial 
event. But prospectively, this makes a lot of difference. For even if we grant that it can 
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sometimes make sense to choose suffering for the sake of some good it will help bring 
about, there is still no reason to endure more suffering than is strictly necessary.  
 A third important question is whether there are other possible paths through life 
that will be just as good or better than the creative path, albeit different in the particular 
goods they contain. Suppose that an individual faces the following choice. If she remains 
without treatment for her depression she will have recurring bouts of it. But during the 
periods when she is not depressed, she will be able to pursue her art. Suppose that if she 
accepts treatment, her depressions will be lifted, but that her artistic expression will be—
not absent, but—blunted, different, neither as intense nor as good as before. Suppose also 
that she would find that frustrating, so much so that if she pursues the treatment path she 
would really be better off overall doing something else. Finally, suppose that if she 
received treatment she could pursue an interesting non-artistic career (she has the talents 
or abilities for that career), and she could have other goods as well—significant and long-
lasting relationships and so on. In short, as I imagine it, it is possible for the person she is 
to find great fulfillment in other things, whether she currently realizes that or not. 
Although the goods in this alternative life path would be very different in kind from the 
artistic goods she currently pursues, it might well be that there is much more overall good 
for her in the alternative life. My point is simply that if that is the case, then she should 
pursue the alternative.  
 Everything, of course, turns on one’s theory of well-being, and what elements one 
views as possessing prudential value and how much. Theorists could agree in principle to 
the idea that she ought to pursue an alternative non-creative path with more overall value 
in it, but be unable to agree on what kind of life would actually count as containing more 
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overall value. But we should not confuse the disagreements of theorists of well-being 
(about what kinds of goods can compensate for which others), with the not-uncommon 
lay-person’s rejection of the very idea that a significantly different alternative could be 
just as good. It can be very tempting for an individual already launched on a particular 
path to assume that no other path could possibly be as good for her as the one she 
currently wants to pursue or is pursuing. But as theorists we should we wary of accepting 
such claims. There are many wonderful ways for a life to go even though much of the 
personal goodness of a particular type of life is only fully appreciated by those who are 
currently living it. This makes it hard for individuals to appreciate that possible lives 
quite distinct from their current one might nonetheless—if they were living that life—
strike them as being just as good if not better.  
	
§3.0 Suffering and Its Place in Mind  
 
 I have so far pointed out various problems that confront us when we think about 
the value of negative experiences. We are inattentive to trade-offs, prone to retrospective 
biases and sometimes tempted to valorize negative experiences. But by far the largest 
problem is not having a sufficiently rich vocabulary for talking about negative 
experiences. Most people associate the word ‘suffering’ with physical pain, but although 
real and important, pain is not the only form of suffering. We have too little 
understanding of psychological distress and no good account of which types are worse 
than others.  
 As part of helping us become better at distinguishing different types of negative 
experience, I wish to introduce a particular kind of mental phenomenon, what I shall call 
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a personal perspective (or just perspective, for short). To bring out some of the 
characteristic features of affect generally, and perspectives in particular, I will locate 
them in a dual-process picture of mind (Kahneman 2012).13 This is a view that has come 
to be widely accepted among psychologists, according to which the mind has two semi- 
independent systems of thought.  
 One system (System 1) is extremely fast, its processes largely (though not always) 
unconscious, and involuntary. The other system (System 2) is slower, more effortful, 
conscious and voluntary. One of the primary roles of System 1 is to acquire and pre-sort 
for personal relevance information about the environment. It also offers System 2 
suggestions about what to believe, whether to judge things negatively or positively, and 
how to act. One of the primary roles of System 2 is to take the suggestions of System 1, 
refine them, and elaborate upon them. It is also the job of System 2 to periodically 
question the offerings of System 1 and reject flawed suggestions. System 1 and System 2 
are both systems of thought, which means that they are both in the business of generating 
representations of the world. They produce mental states with content, albeit of quite 
different kinds.  
 There are several advantages to adopting this dual process picture. First, there are 
certain kinds of mental states that are best understood if they are characterized in System 
1 terms: as fast, intuitive, involuntary. Affective processes are like this. We get something 
deeply wrong if we fail to understand the way in which affective phenomena are both 
fast, intuitive and (for the most part) out of our control. Second, even apart from the 
particular characteristics of each system, it is important to recognize the existence of two 
systems of thought. For it is only by postulating two quasi-independent systems that we 
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can begin to offer adequate explanations of internal mental conflict. Though the two 
usually work in harmony, System 1 and System 2 do not always agree.  
 Personal perspectives are affective. 14  However, a perspective is neither an 
emotion nor a mood. For one thing, perspectives typically last longer than either 
emotions or moods. But perspectives are also more basic and more comprehensive. They 
are more basic in the sense that a person’s perspective contributes to determining the 
particular emotions and moods she experiences. A perspective is more comprehensive in 
the sense that its ability to color our perception of the world is more extensive. Currently 
there is no general, agreed upon vocabulary for identifying and discussing perspectives. 
This is part of what I wish to change.  
 So what is a perspective? As we saw, System 1 constantly monitors the 
environment and acquires information. It forms quick assessments of things it deems 
relevant to the individual. Some of these assessments are conscious, but even those that 
are not have the potential to impact consciousness in a variety of ways. However, only a 
sub-set of System 1 assessments are relevant to personal perspectives. These fall into 
three broad categories: (1) assessments of objects of care, (2) assessments of self, and (3) 
assessments of the future. I will explain each in turn.  
 Recall that our affective capacities are what enable us to care about things in the 
world. To care about things (in the basic sense that interests me) does not require great 
cognitive sophistication. We can care about people, objects, sensations, goals, activities, 
events, relationships, achievements, etc. Affect is what enables us to emotionally ‘latch 
on’ to things that we encounter in the world. For most of us, as we grow, our ability to be 
concerned about things expands greatly. To understand a personal perspective, however, 
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we must focus on the smaller set of things that an individual cares about in the most 
basic, emotional sense. These are the things that can elicit reasonably strong emotions. 
The contrast should be familiar enough: suppose two children are hurt in an accident, my 
own child and the child of a stranger. I understand that both events are bad. But only one 
affects me deeply because only my child is an object of care (in this special, defined 
sense) for me.  
 An individual’s personal perspective is partly shaped by the assessments that her 
mind makes with respect to these objects of care. System 1 constantly tracks and 
monitors these and anything that might affect them. In extreme cases (if an object of care 
is, for example, threatened) an emotional reaction may occur. But discrete emotions are 
the unusual event. More often there is just a stream of information coming in, which is to 
one degree or another positive or negative. In light of this information, slight adjustments 
in outlook are made. If things generally appear well with respect to the objects of care, 
then the person’s perspective will be more positive and she will feel better. To the extent 
she is aware of problems or losses, her perspective will be more negative and she will 
feel worse.  
 The second set of relevant assessments are System 1 assessments of the self. 
These intuitive, involuntary assessments occur frequently, where the self is held up to and 
compared with some standard or norm. These need not be reasonable norms, or norms 
widely accepted by others, though they often are. In addition, some people are more 
likely to notice the ways in which they have exceeded norms whereas others are more 
likely to notice ways in which they have fallen short. The cumulative effect over time of 
many such self-assessments is a positive or negative self-picture, which in turn, is an 
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element of personal perspective.  
 A third category of assessment concerns the future. When an individual thinks 
about the future, does she tend to assume that things will go well or go badly? Even when 
a person is not explicitly engaged in trying to think about the future, many events during 
the course of a day will trigger at least momentary assessments of how things are likely to 
go, what might be about to happen: How a relationship is likely to develop, how an 
interview is likely to turn out, whether or not a call is likely to be good or bad news. 
These assessments of the near and far future cumulatively contribute to personal 
perspective. To the extent that more such assessments are negative, the person’s 
perspective will be more negative as well. And vice versa with positive assessments.  
  All three types of intuitive assessment occur constantly, generating for the 
individual an overall picture of how things stand with respect to what matters to her. This 
is by no means her whole view of the world. But it is the best predictor of her emotional 
life.  
 I suggest that we think of personal perspectives as existing along a continuum 
from highly positive to highly negative. Here is one way we might try to make this idea 
concrete. Presumably for any given individual there is some total number of intuitive 
assessments that her System 1 makes over the course of a day. And there must be some 
determinate subset of these that are relevant to her personal perspective in the ways 
described above. Call these the perspective relevant assessments. For a given individual 
and a given day there must then be an answer to the question: what percentage of her 
perspective relevant assessments are either positive in themselves or contribute to 
maintaining a positive outlook? We can then locate particular perspectives along a 
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continuum ranging from highly positive at one end (meaning that a high percentage of the 
perspective relevant assessments are positive) to negative at the other (meaning a very 
low percentage of the perspective relevant assessments are positive). On this model, we 
all of us, all of the time, occupy some personal perspective or other.  
 The continuum is defined in terms of daily degree of positivity. But of course we 
are most often interested in patterns that extend over time: perspectives that persist. The 
framework allows us to do this if we simply plot the daily figures over time. For most 
people, most of the time, perspectives are relatively stable. So although the numbers for 
any given individual will change slightly from day to day, they will presumably tend over 
time to be clustered in the same relatively narrow range of the continuum, unless some 
dramatic shift occurs. And of course, big shifts do occur. It is well known that personal 
events viewed by the individual as very good or very bad (e.g. success in a big project, 
the death of a loved one) can rapidly alter perspective. Changes can also come about 
because of changes internal to the person, as happens, for example, at the onset of 
affective illness. Once we have the idea of a continuum we can adopt quasi-stipulative 
definitions of ranges. We can distinguish on the negative side between suffering and mere 
unhappiness, and on the positive side between mild happiness and more intense 
happiness.  
 I have deliberately sought to devise a way of talking about affective perspectives 
that is independent of the ways in which such perspectives are generated and also 
independent of the extent to which the perspective tracks reality. A person can occupy a 
horrible personal perspective if everything she cares about is going horribly (think of 
someone in a concentration camp). Or she can occupy a horrible perspective because she 
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is in the grips of the severest of depressive episodes. The continuum I have described 
gives us a useful way of comparing and contrasting particular perspectives in terms of 
their degree of positivity and allows us to talk about the connection between individual 
perspectives and welfare.  
 My thesis is simply that it is intrinsically bad for an individual to occupy a bad 
personal perspective, in much the same way it is intrinsically bad for an individual to be 
in pain. Likewise it is intrinsically good for someone to occupy a positive one.15 
Perspectives are not the only intrinsic prudential values, but they are extremely important 
ones. The degree of badness (or goodness) is a function of the location of the perspective 
on the continuum. The less positivity there is in a perspective, the worse that perspective 
is for the individual who occupies it. It is important to grasp that occupying an extremely 
negative perspective feels very bad. We just are evaluative creatures who respond well 
and feel well when we can ‘see’ positives in the world. We wither in the absence of any 
such perception. Whereas philosophy contains much discussion of the badness of 
physical pain, it is all too easy for the intrinsic badness of personal perspectives to be 
overlooked.  
	
§4.0 Important Errors to Avoid   
 
 Our lack of nuanced distinctions in negative psychology contributes to our 
inability to fairly assess the value of negative experiences. Knowing whether a negative 
experience is “worth it” requires assessing whether the prudential goods that come with it 
fully compensate for it. But since different negative experiences have quite different 
degrees of prudential disvalue, no accurate assessment is possible unless we are clear 
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about the kind of experience in question. Two particular types of error are worth 
highlighting: (1) failures to distinguish between types and degrees of negative affect and 
(2) failures to distinguish between negative affect and negative non-affective thought. I 
will describe each type of error briefly.  
 It is easy for people to confuse negative moods with negative perspectives, and to 
confuse mildly negative perspectives with more severe ones. We all experience negative 
moods. These are transient shifts within more stable affective perspectives. A negative 
mood occurs when an individual’s general pattern of appraisal is temporarily disrupted, 
resulting in fewer positive appraisals and (perhaps) more negative ones. The difference 
between moods and perspectives, however, is not simply temporal. Perspectives last 
longer, but they are also more encompassing. A person can be in a bad mood, without it 
affecting most of the appraisals central to her personal perspective. Moods color our 
perception of some things, but perspectives color our perception of many things, 
including the ones most central to us. Similarly, it is important to realize that mildly 
negative perspectives are quite different from severely negative ones. It would take an 
incredible amount of prudential good to make it worthwhile to occupy a severely 
negative perspective.  
 It is also worth calling attention to the possibility of System 1/System 2 
dissonance. When we see a person prone to negative thoughts, we are usually correct in 
assuming that his stated thoughts are reflections of his feelings—i.e. of his negative 
affective perspective. After all, System 1 appraisals are usually taken up and incorporated 
into System 2 thinking. But sometimes System 1 and System 2 come apart. It is possible 
for a person to express many negative thoughts despite not feeling bad. Indeed, it is 
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possible for an extremely negative person at the level of System 2 to be someone who is 
actually quite happy. Admittedly, much empirical evidence suggests that the type of 
person prone to negative thinking is more vulnerable to developing depression or other 
affective disorders. But being at risk for something is not the same as actually developing 
it. Consider the following case:  
 Paul is by nature a very serious person and because of this he is not prone to 
displays of positive affect. He doesn’t smile a lot. He is not effusive. He works in a clinic 
that serves the health needs of the very poor. He has a deeply moralistic side, so if you 
talk to him you will hear a great deal of passionate talk about how cruel and insensitive 
our society is. He is frequently frustrated by people who seem (to him) to be too 
complacent about injustice. If you asked him if he is happy, he would say no. In large 
part, this is because he thinks of happy people as giddy, superficial types and he has 
never been like that. However, it also reflects his sense that it would be indecent for him 
to be happy in the face of the misery he confronts daily in his work.  
 Nonetheless, the negative claims he makes are the expression of Paul’s System 2. 
His personal perspective is fairly positive. He loves his wife and she is as committed as 
he is to the work they do. He is getting recognition from important philanthropists for his 
efforts. Although he deals with many sick, distressed people, he is himself in good health 
and has learned to take days off and allow himself to do things he likes—a good strategy 
for preventing burnout. Although he claims to be pessimistic about the future, at a deeper 
level he is not actually all that worried. He is fairly sure his clinic can continue to operate 
for the foreseeable future at least as well as it has been. In short, though he denies it, and 
though he may superficially strikes some people as unhappy, he is actually quite happy. 
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The lesson here is important. If we take individuals like Paul as our exemplars of 
negative experience, we will not grasp the real plight of those who occupy negative 
perspectives and we will acquire a false sense of what can be accomplished by 
individuals who suffer.  
 
§5 Conclusion  
 Many people believe that negative psychological experiences (which are not the 
same as adversity) can have extrinsic prudential value. Indeed, there is some reason to 
believe that negative psychological experiences offer artists certain kinds of insights. 
However, the interesting question is whether individuals are ever in the position to 
reasonably judge prospectively that such experiences have sufficient extrinsic prudential 
value to make them worth choosing or enduring (when they could be avoided). I think 
that sometimes individuals clearly are in such a position and it can certainly make sense 
sometimes to choose lesser happiness for the sake of other goods. But we must be careful 
how we approach this topic. It is one thing to choose to forgo a highly positive 
perspective, and quite another to embrace a highly negative one.  
 We need to ask whether the goods that come with negative experiences are 
sufficient to outweigh the bad. We need to make sure that there is not another, less 
negative path to the same goods. We need to be aware of the strong tendency towards 
hindsight bias in the narratives of people who have been through tough experiences.  
 Most importantly, however, if we are to assess negative experiences properly, we 
need to be clear what kind of experiences we have in mind. Although mildly negative 
experiences may be worth enduring, especially if they seem to help a person produce 
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things she values, it is much more doubtful that extremely negative experiences are worth 
it. Because we so often confuse the two, discussions of this topic remain superficial. But 
given that much of the debate in the realm of creativity is sparked by the high incidence 
of affective illness in this population, and given that affective illness typically leads to the 
more severe forms of negative experience—to suffering or extreme suffering—it is 
important to recognize the differences. Whatever extrinsic value milder negative 
experiences may have, it is unlikely that suffering in my defined sense has prudential 
value. On my view, choosing to endure such states for the sake of art makes no prudential 
sense even when we acknowledge the great prudential value of creative expression.   
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1 Some studies suggest links with other mental illnesses, including schizophrenia. For 
simplicity, however, I focus here on bi-polar disorder and uni-polar depression. Although 
some people continue to research potential links between schizophrenia and creativity, 
many theorists have concluded that the appearance of a link in the past was really just a 
reflection of the high rate at which people with bi-polar disorder were misdiagnosed with 
schizophrenia.  
 I do not offer a definition of creativity here, since I rely almost exclusively on 
studies of people who are already widely recognized as having artistic talent.   
2	Although impressive, the research linking artistic creativity and mental illness has 
nonetheless been challenged in various ways. I do not explore those challenges here since 
I am interested in the hypothetical: What would it mean if, for a particular person, it were 
the case that negative affect were necessary for creativity? For critical discussions of this 
literature see Kieran (2014) and Gaut (2012).		
3 I use ‘well-being’ to refer to the special kind of value picked out by the locution ‘good 
for so-and-so.’ That which is good for a person is that which benefits her and is in her 
interests. That which is bad for her is harmful and against her interests. I also 
occasionally use ‘welfare,’ and ‘prudential value’ as alternative ways of referring to the 
same kind of value. 
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4 For example, lithium, the most common treatment for bi-polar illness can cause weight 
gain, dry mouth, and hand-tremors. See 
https://www.nim.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a681039. html#side-effects. 
(Accessed July 1, 2016). SSRIs, the most common medications for depression, cause 
sexual dysfunction in 60% of patients (Beck & Alford 2009: p.273).  
5	However, there is an important sense in which I do assume that no simple version of 
desire-satisfactionism is true. If it were, then if a person wanted to risk everything for the 
sake of her art, then doing so would by definition make her better off no matter how much 
she suffered in the process. I do not find this plausible, but I cannot say more in defense 
of this claim here.  
6 See also Shapiro & Weisberg (1999). 
7 One interesting study (Verhaeghen et al. 2005) investigated and found support for the 
idea that self-focused ruminative thought might lead to (1) negative affect and 
depression, on the one hand, and (2) enhanced creativity, on the other. On this model it 
should, in principle, be possible to separate the two effects of rumination. Thus the 
authors of the study describe the implications of their work as, “the cliché that the artist 
must suffer is not true.” However, that is too strong. Even if the two are separable in 
theory, if we do not currently have good ways of separating them in practice, then for the 
foreseeable future they may still be bundled together for creative individuals. Even if the 
type of necessity at issue is not metaphysical or natural necessity, practical necessity is 
still important.  
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8 It is also important to note that more than one theory might be true, i.e. there might be 
more than one way that negative affect contributes to artistic production. For example, 
something like the bundle theory proposed by Verhaeghen et al. (2005) might be true, 
and it might also be true that artists carry away from their experiences insights that are 
valuable (a version of the special ingredient view). If that were the case, then even if it 
became possible to separate elements of the bundle, it might still be true that negative 
affective experiences have significant extrinsic value that would be lost with the use of 
medications to repress negative affect. 
9 Although Jamison (1996) is certainly convinced of the positive value of negative affect, 
her own proffered explanations of the value mostly locate it in relation to the excesses of 
manic states. On her view, negative affect is valuable because it corrects for these 
excesses. So it is not clear from her account whether negative affect would have value for 
people with unipolar depression. 
10 Jamison offers numerous examples including Roethke, “In a dark time, the eye begins 
to see,” Shelley, “Most wretched men/Are cradled into poetry by wrong/ They learn in 
suffering what they teach in song,” and Virginia Woolf who writes “It is always a 
question whether I wish to avoid these glooms…There is an edge to it which I feel is of 
great importance…One goes down into the well and nothing protects one from the assault 
of truth.” (Jamison 1996: 115, 118). The attitudes of artists towards their own negative 
experiences provide us with a reason for wanting to explore the relationship more. 
However, as I emphasize in the next section, their claims cannot simply be accepted at 
face value, since individuals may suffer from retrospective biases. 
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11 Although Jamison (1996) clearly believes in the value of emotional extremes, she is 
not very clear about the nature of that value. At times she suggests that artists gain 
important insights, but she doesn’t elaborate on what these insights might be or how they 
might contribute to art. I have tried in these two paragraphs to put forward a view of my 
own about how that might work. At other times, she emphasizes the value of shifts in 
mood, and still other times the wealth of cognitive material that might be available to the 
mind of someone who frequently inhabits different mood states (which seems to be the 
point about memory and mood congruence that I discuss next). 
12 Kramer, (2000). Kramer’s piece is a response to Carl Elliot (2000) who argues that 
many negative affective states that seem like depression are really instances of 
alienation—an appropriate response to the modern world. 
13 Although Kahneman uses the labels ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2,’ the terms originate 
with Stanovich and West (2000). My own thinking about and understanding of the dual 
process view has been shaped not only by Kahneman, but also by the essays in Hassin et 
al. (2005) and Evans et al. (2009).  
14	Though this is not to deny the importance of System 2. Many affective phenomena are 
refined by, and given a more concrete formulation by, System 2. For example, on my 
view, particular emotions begin as System 1 assessments, but often gain an additional 
layer of complexity from System 2. However, this is all compatible with my claim that 
personal perspectives are generated by System 1, and that personal perspectives are, for 
the most part, a System 1 phenomenon.		
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15	Although a positive perspective is intrinsically good, it is not the only good thing in a 
life, and therefore not in itself a guarantee of a good life overall. Consider the example of 
someone living in an experience machine who has a positive perspective. I maintain that 
it is typically worse to be in an experience machine than not, but if you are going to be in 
an experience machine you are better off with a positive perspective than with a negative 
one. This is what I mean when I say that a positive perspective is good in itself.			
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